



# The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity

2016-2028

22 November 2011



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## Foreword

*From the Director  
U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center*

TRADOC Pam 525-8-4, *The U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity, 2016-2028*, describes the Army's overarching conceptual framework for building partner capacity (BPC) and the capabilities future Army forces will require to execute this framework. Current defense guidance reaffirms the requirement to reassure our friends and partners, engage multilaterally, and work with partners to develop the capabilities and capacities that will contribute to a more stable international security environment, and, if necessary, assist us to prevail in armed conflict.

The Army's approach to BPC relies on comprehensive and sustained engagement with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests. The Army's primary role in BPC is to develop security capacity. Engaging partners to build their capacity to defend themselves and serve as effective partners contributes to a military posture that both deters potential adversaries and preserves our ability to act if deterrence fails. Further, it provides a potential worldwide forward basing structure that is an essential element of joint force operations to gain and maintain access against adversaries who are increasingly focused on denying us freedom of action in the global commons.

BPC complements the Army core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Combined arms maneuver enables Army forces to gain and exploit the initiative; wide area security enables Army forces to consolidate gains and set conditions for a stable environment; and, BPC enables partners to contribute to preventing or prevailing in armed conflict. Army forces must be capable of conducting all three – combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and activities to build partner capacity – and often simultaneously. This will challenge our Soldiers, leaders, and organizations to exhibit a high degree of operational adaptability.

TRADOC Pam 525-8-4 makes an important contribution to realizing the broad vision outlined in both TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1. It serves as a foundation for future force development focused on activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity. It also serves as a point of departure for wide-ranging discussions, wargames, and experimentation. This concept represents a significant step forward in an ongoing campaign of learning and directly contributes toward achieving greater institutional adaptation across our Army.



**KEITH C. WALKER**  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Director Army Capabilities  
Integration Center

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Military Operations

U.S. ARMY CONCEPT FOR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN E. STERLING  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Commanding General/  
Chief of Staff



CHARLES E. HARRIS III  
Colonel, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

**History.** TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-4, *U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity, 2016-2028*, is a new leadership directed concept created as part of the Army Concept Framework. It is fully nested with and expands on the central and supporting ideas of both TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1.

**Summary.** The pamphlet describes the broad concept and capabilities the Army will require in 2016-2028 to build partner capacity. This concept will lead force development and modernization efforts for building partner capacity by establishing a common framework.

**Applicability.** This concept is the foundation for future Army force development and for developing future concepts, capability based assessments, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents, experimentation, and doctrine pertaining to building partner capacity. It supports experimentation described in the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign Plan and functions as the conceptual basis for developing solutions to the future force pertaining to building partner capacity across the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). This concept applies to all TRADOC, Department of Army and Army Reserve Component activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements. Other Army concepts will be fully nested with TRADOC Pam 525-8-4.

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**Suggested improvements.** Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements via The Army Suggestion Program online at <https://armysuggestions.army.mil> (Army Knowledge Online account required) or via DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson Ave., Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5763. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

**Availability.** This regulation is available on the TRADOC homepage at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/>.

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*“Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”*

*– President Barack Obama*

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

#### **1-1. Purpose**

a. TRADOC Pam 525-8-4 provides the Army’s overarching conceptual framework for building partner capacity (BPC) and describes the capabilities future Army forces will require to execute the concept. The concept expands on the ideas pertaining to BPC in the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pam 525-3-0, and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1. BPC is currently defined as the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners<sup>1</sup> for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and critical government functions.

b. This concept consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces BPC. Chapter 2 frames the environment, that is, the context within which the Army conducts activities that build partner capacity. Chapter 3 frames the military problem and provides the central idea and broad, general approach to solve the problem.<sup>2</sup> Chapter 4 summarizes the concept’s major ideas.

#### **1-2. Background**

a. The United States (U.S.) and the U.S. Army have been involved in security cooperation, advising, or training foreign forces for most of the nation’s history.<sup>3</sup> Emerging challenges make these efforts more important than ever. The rise of new powers, the growing influence of nonstate actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other destructive technologies, the socioeconomic trends, and the accelerating pace of change exceed the U.S. capacity – and resources – to surmount.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, threats to U.S. security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength.<sup>5</sup> In some cases, the direct employment of U.S. forces could be objectionable, infeasible, or counterproductive to the long-term security objective of foreign partners’ demonstrating their own sovereign power.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the President’s mandate quoted at the start of this chapter summons the Nation to work with partners to enhance capabilities and capacities because doing so reduces the likelihood of armed conflict, extends security to areas the U.S. cannot reach alone, and garners support for armed conflict should it become necessary.<sup>7</sup>

b. Other nations and private institutions – both foreign and domestic – also focus on promoting the capacity of individuals, groups, and nations for self-determination. They may engage in activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity for interests which may align, differ, or be at odds with U.S. interests. Their scope, capabilities, and capacities may also differ from those of the U.S. Incorporating these entities into a collective effort yields results greater than the sum of each working separately and concurrently promotes mutual trust and confidence. Mutual trust and confidence, in turn, may bolster other mutually beneficial

undertakings. A collaborative and comprehensive approach<sup>8</sup> to activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity also provides unique opportunities to train with and learn from counterparts.

c. Partners' enhanced capacity improves the international security environment and contributes to the security of the U.S. homeland,<sup>9</sup> which is the highest priority for the Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>10</sup> The military has traditionally executed this priority by projecting power overseas.<sup>11</sup> While missions abroad continue to play a vital role for the security of the U.S., the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and continued terrorist threats since then emphasize the need to prevent, deter, and defeat aggression aimed directly at the U.S. homeland. The Army integrates with U.S. Federal, state, and local governments, law enforcement agencies, and other domestic agencies to support or augment the security of the homeland through the conduct of homeland defense<sup>12</sup> and civil support.<sup>13</sup> However, the Army does not have the responsibility, authority, or resources to build domestic security capacity. For the purpose of this concept, capacity-building is limited to foreign partners.

### **1-3. Assumptions**

a. The assumptions from TRADOC Pam 525-3-0<sup>14</sup> and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1<sup>15</sup> concerning the character of future armed conflict are based, in large measure, on the complexity and uncertainty of the future operational environment (OE) as well as an assessment of anticipated future enemies and U.S. capabilities. Those assumptions apply equally to this concept.

b. The assumptions below add to the assumptions from the references stated above and apply specifically to this concept.

(1) Building partners' capacity for security and governance will remain a mainstay of U.S. national security strategy and be supported by the national will and diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures.

(2) The Army will be resourced appropriately to lead or support unified action<sup>16</sup> to enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

### **1-4. Linkage to the Army Concept Framework (ACF)**

a. The ACF comprises TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, six subordinate Army functional concepts, existing concept capability plans, and leadership-directed concepts.<sup>17</sup> The ACF provides the intellectual underpinning for making institutional adaptations to enhance the Army's ability to conduct full-spectrum operations.<sup>18</sup> It allows the Army to re-examine its fundamentals across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains to provide a force that can achieve a standard of operational adaptability for the Nation.

b. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 provides the Army’s vision of future armed conflict and describes the broad capabilities the Army will require in 2016-2028. It stipulates that the Army must have the capability to develop the indigenous capacity necessary to achieve self-determination because successful full-spectrum operations require working with partners and among diverse populations.<sup>19</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 also establishes seven core operational actions the Army must be able to perform to meet future security challenges.<sup>20</sup>

c. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 describes the Army’s contribution to national security within the context of joint operations. The ability to conduct *unified land operations*<sup>21</sup> rests on the Army’s two core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces or to seize, occupy, and defend land areas to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure and activities, deny the enemy positions of advantage, and consolidate gains to retain the initiative. BPC complements both combined arms maneuver and wide area security in that the goal of BPC is to prevent and deter armed conflict altogether. Thus, while partners’ enhanced security capacity contributes to all phases of military campaigns, the activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity yield the greatest return on investment in Phase 0

d. TRADOC Pam 525-8-4 continues the Army’s institutional adaptation to an ever-changing global security environment. This concept benefits from the key ideas and required capabilities of the other concepts within the ACF. Similarly, the key ideas and required capabilities of this concept should inform the next revision of the ACF.

## 1-5. References

Required and related publications are listed in appendix A.

## 1-6. Explanation of abbreviations and terms.

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

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*“The most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”*

*– Robert M. Gates*

## Chapter 2

### Framing the Environment

#### 2-1. Introduction

This chapter frames the environment, that is, the context within which future Army forces execute activities to build partner capacity. The chapter reviews strategic guidance relating to BPC; explains the activities and programs related to BPC; summarizes DOD and Army responsibilities for activities that build partner capacity; codifies the initiatives the Army continues to implement to enhance the ability of its Soldiers, leaders, and units to execute

activities that build partner capacity; and discusses key aspects of the future OE that may affect activities, programs, and engagements to build partner capacity.

## 2-2. Strategic guidance

a. Strategic guidance documents are the starting point for identifying and developing future force capabilities.”<sup>22</sup> The U.S. strategic guidance hierarchy is depicted at figure 2-1.<sup>23</sup>

(1) The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) emphasizes that “no one nation – no matter how powerful – can meet the daunting global security challenges alone”<sup>24</sup> and asserts, “we will...use development and security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of violent extremism.”<sup>25</sup>



**Figure 2-1. Strategic guidance hierarchy**

(2) The *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) makes clear DOD’s core responsibility is to defend the U.S. from attack upon its territory at home and to secure U.S. interests abroad. It also declares, “We will support, train, advise, and equip partner security forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats. We will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation, just as we will learn valuable skills and information from others better situated to understand some of the complex challenges we face together.”<sup>26</sup>

(3) The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) directs that, “joint force, combatant commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners.”<sup>27</sup> It underscores the need to make capacity-building resources more flexible, the processes less cumbersome, and the efforts across departments and programs – defense, diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and intelligence – more complementary.<sup>28</sup>

(4) The *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*. The Army does not have the responsibility, authority, or resources for building the capacity of domestic agencies. Hence,

homeland defense and civil support are not addressed in this concept. Refer to the actual document for details on homeland defense and civil support.

(5) The *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* (GEF) transitions DOD's planning from a contingency-centric approach to a strategy-centric approach. Its planning construct is based upon the premise that the most effective way to maintain stability and security is to assume a proactive, deliberate approach that emphasizes preventing conflict and enhancing interoperability with international partners so that should shaping and deterrence fail coalition operational objectives can be achieved as quickly as possible.<sup>29</sup> The GEF directs combatant commanders to create campaign plans<sup>30</sup> to achieve theater and functional strategic end states. The GEF identifies ten strategic end states and eleven security cooperation focus areas for the armed forces.<sup>31</sup>

(a) Of the ten strategic end states, the seven that pertain to BPC are:

- The proliferation of WMD and associated technology is prevented; emerging WMD development is prevented; WMD stockpiles are secure and being reduced; and, the use of WMD is deterred or defeated.
- The U.S. retains strategic access, including unhindered access to and use of the global commons (relevant portions of the maritime, space, air, and cyberspace domains) and ensures the security and free flow of global commerce, especially energy resources.
- Alliances and partnerships are strengthened and expanded and the U.S. is viewed as the partner of choice – respected as a fair and trusted partner in the international community.
- Fragile and failing states are prevented from posing a threat to U.S. interests.
- Partner nations provide for their own security, contribute effectively to broader regional or global security challenges, and maintain professional, civilian-led militaries that respect human rights.
- Major world powers (such as, China, Russia, India) contribute effectively to addressing shared global challenges and to the maintenance of the international order.
- Innocent civilians and vulnerable populations are protected from the threat of mass atrocities or genocide, and foreign civil authorities are adequately supported to prevent mass atrocities and to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events.

(b) Of the 11 security cooperation focus areas, 5 pertain directly to BPC. They are:

- Operational capacity and capability building – focusing on providing the necessary training and equipment required to develop and improve operational capacity, capability, and performance of partner military forces.
- Human capacity and human capital development – focusing on key individual military members and civilian security officials from a partner country and developing the human capacity needed by those individuals to sustain their defense sector over time.
- Institutional capacity and security sector reform – focusing on the security institutions of a partner country and the development of the necessary systems and processes to sustain operational and tactical capacities and human capital over time.
- Support to institutional capacity and civil-sector capacity building – focusing on support by DOD to non-security sector portions of partner nations to strengthen the capacity and capability of these partners at the local and national levels to deliver services to their own people through stable and effective civil sector institutions.

- Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization – focusing on the capacity of a partner to operate effectively alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces in a coalition or formal alliance.

b. Nested with the strategic guidance documents, the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) provides guidance, assigns specific planning tasks, and apportions forces. The JSCP is a joint planning document that provides guidance to the combatant commanders and service chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities to fulfill the strategic end states in the GEF. It is the cornerstone document, which officially starts deliberate planning. The JSCP, one of the products of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), is the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in titles 6, 10, 22, and 50 of the United States Code (USC). The primary roles are to conduct independent assessments; provide independent advice to the President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council; and, assist the President and SECDEF in providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS enables the CJCS to effectively assess, advise, direct, and execute in fulfillment of these statutory responsibilities.<sup>32</sup>

c. The *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* makes clear the U.S. does not have the resources to address the myriad challenges posed by the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of WMD and other destructive technologies, the enduring and emerging socioeconomic trends, and the accelerating pace of change.<sup>33</sup> The QDR Report calculates that threats to U.S. security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength and, consequently, enabling partners to respond to security challenges reduces risk to U.S. forces and extends security to areas the U.S. military cannot reach alone.<sup>34</sup>

d. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) emphasizes that, in some cases, the direct employment of U.S. forces could be objectionable, infeasible, or counterproductive to the long-term security objective of indigenous governments demonstrating individual sovereign power. Additionally, some will oppose any U.S. military commitment solely to restrain the exercise of American power. Hence, the U.S. must cooperate with key allies and partners to build and sustain peace and security. The future joint force will find it necessary to pursue objectives by enabling and supporting such partners. Indeed, U.S. forces may need to minimize visibility by operating in a supporting role, allowing partners to take the lead, even at some expense in reduced operational efficiency.<sup>35</sup>

e. The *2011 Army Posture Statement* encapsulates the above as follows: “The challenges to our country’s security are complex and cannot be mastered solely by military means or through U.S. unilateral actions. It is therefore important that the U.S. Army continue multifaceted efforts that significantly contribute to improved U.S. relationships with allied and partner nations while simultaneously enhancing our collective capacity to meet those challenges.”<sup>36</sup>

f. The *Army Security Cooperation Strategy* (ASCS) points out that partners capable of securing themselves reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and are more likely to support U.S.

military operations when required.<sup>37</sup> Thus, “Security cooperation activities are intended to build the another nation’s capacity to secure their own people and territory, prevent the use of their territory by extremist organizations, and build lasting and meaningful relationships to ensure access and cooperation in military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”<sup>38</sup> The ASCS adds that Army security cooperation activities also enhance the capacity of and assist partners with “political, economic, and information programs”, and concomitantly benefit Army forces by “improving interoperability, developing culturally attuned leaders and Soldiers, and gaining access to leading technologies.”<sup>39</sup>

g. The imperative for shared global security responsibility led DOD to establish building partnerships as one of nine Tier I joint capability areas (JCAs). In the JCA framework, building partnerships is defined as, “the ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior and capabilities.”<sup>40</sup> Three of its tier II and tier III JCAs also bear directly on BPC:

(1) JCA 8.2, shape. The ability to conduct activities with partner leaders, security institutions, and relevant populations to build defense relationships that promote shared global security interests, develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.<sup>41</sup>

(2) JCA 8.2.1, partner with governments and institutions. The ability to establish or strengthen formal or informal relationships with domestic and foreign institutions, countries, or populations to further U.S. national security or shared global security interests.<sup>42</sup>

(3) JCA 8.2.3, build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions. The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities, for mutual benefit, to address U.S. national or shared global security interests.<sup>43</sup>

### **2-3. Activities and programs that build partner capacity**

a. BPC is achieved by applying a variety of ways and means – security cooperation, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance – to achieve the ends. Each of these is briefly discussed below.

#### **(1) Security cooperation.**

(a) Joint publication (JP) 1-02 defines security cooperation as, “all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”

(b) DOD Directive 5132.03 expands the scope of security cooperation by defining it as “activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation includes all DOD interactions with

foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.”<sup>44</sup>

(c) Security cooperation activities in which the Army participates are authorized by various sections of the USC, most notably within Title 10 (Armed Forces) and Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse). These statutes provide operational and budgetary authorities for security cooperation activities and security assistance programs, the latter of which are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.<sup>45</sup>

(2) Security force assistance (SFA).

(a) Field manual (FM) 3-07 defines SFA as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

(b) JP 1-02 and DOD Instructions (DODI) 5000.68 expand the scope of SFA beyond security forces to include their supporting institutions: “The DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. It is DOD policy that SFA be a subset of DOD overall security cooperation initiatives and that SFA activities directly increase the capacity or capability of a foreign security force or their supporting institutions.”<sup>46</sup> DOD policy also specifies that the portion of SFA oriented towards supporting a host country’s efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency is a subset of foreign internal defense (FID).<sup>47</sup>

(3) FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”<sup>48</sup> The U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct FID.<sup>49</sup> FID has been and remains an Army special operations forces (ARSOF) core task. FID and SFA are the same when the capacity of a host nation is being built to counter an internal threat. FID is conducted as part of the nation’s internal defense and development strategy; however, SFA can be conducted in the absence of an internal defense and development strategy using different funding authority. Additionally, SFA can be employed to increase a host nation’s capability to counter external threats whereas FID cannot. Similarly, FID can be used in other than security sector development to counter internal threats while SFA cannot.<sup>50</sup>

(4) Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.<sup>51</sup> DOD

policy recognizes security assistance programs as critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities.<sup>52</sup>

## 2-4. Responsibilities

a. Responsibilities for security cooperation are codified in DOD Directive (DODD) 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*. Due to their length, only a synopsis of key responsibilities is addressed below.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the SECDEF on security cooperation matters. The USD(P) develops, coordinates, and articulates SECDEF security cooperation goals, policy, priorities, and guidance.<sup>53</sup>

c. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) directs, administers, and provides DOD-wide guidance to the DOD components and DOD representatives to U.S. missions for the execution of security cooperation programs for which it has responsibility. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency identifies requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of security cooperation organizations (SCO) personnel and others who manage its security cooperation-related programs; approves SCO joint manpower programs involving the establishment of new security cooperation organizations or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure; reports readiness of personnel for security cooperation programs over which it has responsibility; and acts as the Executive Agent for DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies.<sup>54</sup> Its Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management provides professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through security assistance and security cooperation.<sup>55</sup>

d. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) establishes policies for the effective development of international acquisition, technology, and logistics programs that support the objectives and end states outlined in the GEF; ensures conformance with international armaments cooperation, industrial collaboration, and technology release policies; coordinates on security cooperation policy guidance and campaign plans; and provides advice and technical assistance to USD(P) and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to accomplish the objectives of security cooperation programs.<sup>56</sup>

e. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develops and oversees implementation of defense intelligence security cooperation campaign plans; establishes policies, procedures, and priorities for allocating and managing defense intelligence security cooperation activities that support the objectives and end states outlined in the GEF; and provides oversight for intelligence security cooperation agreements conducted by the DOD intelligence agencies.<sup>57</sup>

f. Secretaries of the Military Departments responsibilities include allocating resources to achieve stated security cooperation objectives; advising and providing recommendations to the SECDEF to ensure the successful conduct of security cooperation programs; developing

campaign support plans for security cooperation programs and activities; conducting international armaments cooperation with eligible friendly foreign countries and international organizations; conducting military education and training and sales of defense articles and defense services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations in accordance with policies and criteria established by the USD(P) and the Director, DSCA; providing technical information and data on weapon systems, tactics, doctrine, training, capabilities, logistic support, price, source, availability, and lead-time for developing and reviewing security cooperation programs; providing qualified military and civilian personnel to carry out security cooperation assignments; ensuring conformance with technology transfer, classified military information release, and disclosure policies for their respective areas of responsibility while conducting security cooperation activities; and assisting Director, DSCA, and USD(AT&L) in government-to-government or interdepartmental discussions or negotiations involving security cooperation.<sup>58</sup>

g. CJCS responsibilities include providing implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and providing SECDEF with military advice concerning security cooperation; reviewing and overseeing deconfliction of combatant command campaign plans, including security cooperation aspects; reviewing campaign plan assessments and advising USD(P) on the effectiveness of DOD security cooperation efforts; modifying Global Force Management Board (GFMB) processes and procedures to account for force requirements for security cooperation; assigning force and activity designators for priorities in the allocation of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training among partner countries and organizations; and recommending priorities of allocation of materiel and equipment for partner countries when competing needs cannot be resolved by Director, DSCA.<sup>59</sup>

h. Combatant commanders are at the heart of activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity. Combatant commanders develop campaign plans to conduct security cooperation activities and programs and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments in accordance with the GEF. They provide assistance as requested by the USD(P) or the Director, DSCA. Combatant commanders supervise the SCOs in matters related to execution of the GEF, including the provision of necessary technical assistance and administrative support to the SCOs.<sup>60</sup>

i. SCOs, most typically the Office of Defense Cooperation, enable geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to engage the partner nation's military and security forces. If an SCO office is not physically present in the country, a non-resident security cooperation responsibility is typically assigned to an SCO in another country within the GCC's area of responsibility. The J5 (Strategic Planning and Policy) Directorate normally develops the theater security cooperation plan based on guidance received from DOD and the joint staff. The GCCs also have authority over SCOs that may reside within the U.S. Embassy country teams as well as theater special operations command (with its special operations forces) and Theater Army and/or Army service component command (ASCC). Army forces supporting activities and engagements to build partner capacity generally are under the administrative control of and receive their missions from the theater Army and/or ASCC. These missions emanate in support of the GCC's theater security cooperation plan and daily operations requirements during the period of shaping operations (Phase 0). A SCO may also generate missions validated by the GCC for emergent

security cooperation requirements. The SCO must consult the chief of mission and or country team and the GCC concerning the partner nation's desire for particular support or activity. Once approved, the GCC tasks the theater Army and/or ASCC.<sup>61</sup>

j. Given the Army's critical role in conducting activities that support GEF end states and combatant commanders' objectives, the Army established Army Campaign Plan objective 8.3 to "Adapt the Army for Building Partner Capacity."<sup>62</sup> Objective 8.3 is focused on 24 outcomes that improve Army processes and capabilities for planning, training, material support, and resourcing security cooperation activities. In March 2011, the Army promulgated the fiscal year (FY) 2012 Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP) to enable ASCCs to support combatant commander functional and theater campaign plan objectives, thereby enabling combatant commanders to support the achievement of DOD functional and theater end states, as specified in the GEF.<sup>63</sup> The FY 2012 ACSP specifies the Army will conduct all Army activities that support campaign plan objectives *by, with, and through* the ASCCs.<sup>64</sup>

k. To enable ASCCs to support the achievement of combatant commander functional and theater campaign plan objectives, the FY2012 ACSP directs supporting tasks to Army commands and direct reporting units and specifies the Army is establishing regionally aligned brigades, augmented by the Generating Force (GF) and Reserve component capabilities, with the capacity and proficiency for a broad range of security cooperation activities with partner countries.<sup>65</sup> To support the training of regionally aligned brigades and to ensure the availability of required funding and authorities, the Army is developing activities plans that extend into the future years defense program linked to support requirements identified by DOD end states and objectives. Additional Army capabilities to support combatant commander's campaign objectives will be developed through Army Campaign Plan objective 8.3.<sup>66</sup>

l. As the nexus for Army security cooperation programs and activities in support of combatant commander functional and theater campaign plan objectives, ASCCs write supporting plans that delineate how the Army can achieve those objectives. Combatant commander functional and theater campaign plan objectives in accordance with the GEF vary widely and, hence, ASCCs have great latitude in developing their supporting plans. The FY2012 ACSP however, specifies seven tasks common to all ASCCs, which are listed below.

- (1) Develop an annual GEF end state activities plan as part of each annual ACSP.
- (2) Demonstrate how Army activities support GEF end states and campaign plan objectives.
- (3) Establish lines of effort and/or activity to achieve GEF end states and campaign plan objectives.
- (4) Prioritize activities that support GEF end states and campaign plan objectives.
- (5) Coordinate all Army security cooperation activities in their area of responsibilities to enable combatant commanders to reflect those activities in their plans;

(6) Ensure all planned security cooperation activities are entered into the appropriate GCC or Army Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System.

(7) Provide appropriate representation in the ACSP synchronization forums.<sup>67</sup>

m. Commands submit Army security cooperation requirements five years prior to year of execution in the Programming Objective Memorandum cycle. Initial command submissions serve as a start point for unit preparations and for defense of budget submission. The requirements are forecast in progressively greater details to enable resourcing through planning, programming, budgeting, and execution and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) processes. Prior to the budget year, commands convert the requirements to a greater level of detail in terms of capabilities and capacities to ensure units entering ARFORGEN develop the correct regional orientation and focused training. The year prior to the actual year of execution, commands provide execution level detail (geographic location, start and stop dates, number of personnel, special tasks, and others) to allow for the completion of the execution order.<sup>68</sup>

n. Army forces conducting SFA activities are under either the operational control or tactical control of the SCO, depending upon the situation when deployed to a partner nation. Army forces may be placed under operational or tactical control of another U.S. government lead agency for an activity for countries without a resident DOD representative. For countries with neither a DOD representative on the country team nor another U.S. government agency designated as the country team lead for the activity, a military liaison team provided by the combatant command or ASCC may be temporarily attached to the U.S. embassy, reporting directly to the chief of mission.<sup>69</sup>

o. At the Army staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, is the Army's focal point for planning, integrating, and overseeing Army security cooperation.<sup>70</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) also administers the civil military emergency preparedness program, which supports capacity development and theater security cooperation by developing and encouraging civilian and military cooperation. The program also provides multinational force compatibility to plan for humanitarian response to all forms of disaster (natural and technological) and improved capability to manage the consequences of WMD. The civil military emergency preparedness program develops activities that increase partners' ability to create and implement civil-military disaster preparedness plans, thereby reducing long-term reliance on U.S. Army assets to respond to emergencies.

p. As the Army's representative to the GFMB, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) plays a crucial role in integrating operational support from the GF. Though HQDA G-3/5/7 retains oversight of GF capabilities, FORSCOM ensures the GFMB is aware of these capabilities and recommends their employment to meet specific capabilities requirements. As part of its review of contingency and crisis action plans, HQDA G-3/5/7 verifies that plans incorporate appropriate GF capabilities.<sup>71</sup> When ongoing operations require GF capabilities, the ASCC notifies FORSCOM, other relevant GF organizations, and HQDA. The organizations affected then develop and provide recommendations for providing the capability required.

q. Within TRADOC, the Security Assistance Training Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, manages assigned Title 22 security assistance responsibilities within the Army's foreign military sales (FMS) enterprise construct. TRADOC's Security Assistance Training Field Activity has the mission to manage U.S. Army-sponsored security assistance training programs (Title 22) and selected DOD programs (Title 10) that bring approved international military students and civilians to U.S. Army-managed training in the continental U.S. (CONUS).<sup>72</sup> TRADOC also manages three initiatives that support BPC efforts: the Army culture and foreign language strategy; human terrain system; and, development of the cultural knowledge consortium for the Army.<sup>73</sup>

r. The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, under the U.S. Army Materiel Command, is the Army's organization responsible for the execution off security assistance materiel and services programs. The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization has the mission to plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain, and redeploy CONUS-based security assistance teams, primarily providing technical assistance, extended training services, mobile training teams, and predeployment site surveys in support of FMS equipment or systems sales.<sup>74</sup>

s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is assigned responsibility for major construction activities with specified geographic areas of responsibility. Initially, USACE gained HQDA approval to establish a forward division and three subordinate districts in Iraq and one independent district in Afghanistan to support reconstruction operations. The time required to gain approval of the organizational structure to execute large-scale reconstructions operations, however, restricted the ability to deploy capabilities into a theater of operations rapidly. To mitigate this constraint, USACE developed and HQDA approved a concept plan that enabled USACE to retain the district organizational structure developed for Iraq which could be rapidly activated when required. The concept plan also provided for the permanent formation of a deployable contingency division headquarters to command the deployable districts.<sup>75</sup>

t. In support of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Army North supports numerous whole-of-government efforts to develop mutual capacity and capabilities with Canadian and Mexican security forces. These efforts include supporting the development of a U.S. – Canada combined defense plan that enables the collaborative, cooperative, or combined defense of both countries. Supporting the development of a U.S.-Canada civil assistance plan that governs the means by which the military forces of one nation support the military forces of the other nation, as it provides military support to its civilian authorities in case of a natural or manmade disaster. Conducting annual conferences with the six Canadian regional joint task forces to improve U.S. – Canadian interoperability. Efforts also include conducting an annual border commanders conference with the Mexican Army military region commanders along the U.S. southwestern border to enhance security of the southern land approaches to the U.S. homeland. Establishing the Fifth Army Inter-American Relations Program to provide a forum for exposing senior Mexican Army officers to U.S. Army tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance Mexican officer capacity. Finally, efforts include establishing border communications architecture with the Mexican army along the U.S. southwestern border to facilitate regular operational coordination and cooperation between U.S. civilian law enforcement agencies charged with border security and Mexican army units on the border with the same mission.<sup>76</sup>

## **2-5. Army initiatives to build partner capacity**

a. Activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity differ widely, but each supports one or more of the GEF theater and functional strategic end states. The importance and quantity of these actions in the aftermath of 9/11 increased beyond the capacity of ARSOF alone.<sup>77</sup> General purpose forces contributed heavily in developing the capacity of host governments' security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, on June 28, 2004, the Army supported the establishment of the Multinational Security and Transition Command-Iraq, which organized, trained, and equipped more than 250 Army and police battalions throughout the country<sup>78</sup> and the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan in May 2002. The Army also supported the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan in November 2009 to build a professional Afghanistan national security force,<sup>79</sup> and the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program in the Spring of 2010 to build institutional capacity for the security ministries in Afghanistan.<sup>80</sup>

b. The Army continues to learn from ongoing operations and adapt doctrine, force structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities accordingly. Some recent steps the Army has taken to build partner capacity and achieve the GEF end states and combatant command theater objectives include the following.

(1) Establishing a system to support field commanders with transition teams<sup>81</sup> and provincial reconstruction teams<sup>82</sup> and added permanent force structure for human terrain teams<sup>83</sup> and red teams.<sup>84</sup>

(2) Executing more than \$60 billion in sales of military equipment and contracts to allies and partners over the last five years.<sup>85</sup>

(3) Executing over \$312 million in training and education with allies and partners in FY10, including approximately 10,000 foreign students in TRADOC and Army managed schools and 56 foreign cadets from 37 countries attending the U.S. Military Academy through the 4-Year International Cadet Program.<sup>86</sup>

(4) Deploying, in one year alone, 15 training teams to 8 countries in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; 12 training teams to 8 countries in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility; 3 teams to 2 countries in U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility; and 6 teams in 5 countries in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility.<sup>87</sup>

(5) Conducting training and doctrine conferences with counterpart commands in Germany, France, Korea, Japan, and Singapore and a future battlefield conference with Israel to exchange information, concepts, and ideas.<sup>88</sup>

(6) Engaging in water resource matters and conflict management with the member countries of the Mekong River Commission.<sup>89</sup>

(7) Conducting staff talks, which resulted in interoperability agreements with the Australian, French, German, and British Armies, included developments in counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine and associated lessons learned.<sup>90</sup>

(8) Participating in the American Cooperation Program to develop cooperative security arrangements with Mexico and improve cooperation with the Colombian army in counterdrug operations.<sup>91</sup>

(9) Training 255 foreign students in institutional medical courses and facilities in the U.S. and Europe.<sup>92</sup>

(10) Conducting worldwide emerging infection surveillance and research on tropical diseases such as malaria, human immunodeficiency virus, and Ebola drugs and vaccines at the medical research unit facilities in Kenya and Thailand.<sup>93</sup>

(11) Providing medical care to foreign military wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>94</sup>

(12) Launching a pilot program partnering foreign military medical facilities with corresponding U.S. Army medical facilities.<sup>95</sup>

(13) Supporting the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development with infrastructure construction in Armenia, Bangladesh, Georgia, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Ecuador, and Colombia.<sup>96</sup>

(14) Augmenting brigades for advise and assist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>97</sup>

(15) Adding a security cooperation element to each ASCC to act as the primary coordination point between the ASCC and country teams, security cooperation organizations, combatant command staffs, region-specific special operations command elements, and HQDA for all security cooperation-related activities and programs.<sup>98</sup>

(16) Expanding the active Army civil affairs force structure from one battalion of four companies to two brigades with a total of 60 companies by FY 2013.<sup>99</sup>

(17) Regionally-aligning forces with capabilities, capacity, and proficiency for a broad range of security cooperation activities with partner countries.<sup>100</sup>

(18) Establishing a permanent training brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana to provide military transition teams as well as on-site regionally focused cultural awareness training.<sup>101</sup>

(19) Supporting the DOD-established Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and providing as its director the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.<sup>102</sup>

## **2-6. The future OE**

a. The OE, drawn from the *TRADOC Operational Environment 2009-2025*, is intended to set the stage for the sections that follow by providing context for discussing BPC and the resulting required capabilities. Four aspects of the future OE provide that context: increasing numbers of actors, enduring and emerging socioeconomic trends, security threats, and security capacity. A synopsis of each follows.

b. Increasing number of actors. More actors exert power and influence in the emerging OE. Europe is now more united, free, and at peace than ever before and the European Union has deepened its integration. Russia has reemerged in the international arena and China and India are becoming more engaged globally. From Latin America to Africa to the Pacific, new and emerging powers provide opportunities for partnership, even as a handful of states endanger regional and global security by flouting international norms. At the same time, individuals, corporations, and civil society play an increasingly important role in shaping events around the world. International institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund perform a critical role in facilitating cooperation, but cannot address new threats or seize new opportunities.<sup>103</sup>

c. Enduring and emerging socioeconomic trends. Demographic trends such as urbanization, youth bulges, and migration create overpopulated megacities in which a growing pool of youth is willing to engage in civil resistance and/or violence to achieve its goals. Environmental changes result in water, food, and fuel shortages that require collective action, often where no tradition of cross-group cooperation exists. Globalization and ready access to information increases the perception of inequity and relative deprivation between individuals, groups, and nations that were previously unknown to each other, creating informed classes of haves and have-nots.<sup>104</sup>

d. Security threats. The 2010 QDR Report postulates threats to U.S. security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength.<sup>105</sup> A useful way to think about future threats is to distinguish between the most likely from the most dangerous. Violent extremism – manifesting itself in the form of violent individuals, non-state entities acting on deeply held convictions, or state sponsored proxies carrying out violent acts in support of extremist agenda – remains the most likely threat to U.S. interests. While extremist acts can cause great damage and regional instability that may require U.S. intervention, the most dangerous threat to U.S. interests continues to be posed by nation states possessing both conventional military and WMD capabilities with intent to deploy. Potential adversaries will attempt to deny U.S. access to key regions through comprehensive anti-access campaigns including physical and cyber attacks, attacks in vulnerable areas of the global commons, and threats to U.S. partners and potential partners – all magnified by sophisticated global information campaigns.<sup>106</sup> To attend to this broad array of threats, the NSS asserts the U.S. military must maintain its conventional superiority and nuclear deterrent capability while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserve access to the global commons,<sup>107</sup> and strengthen partners.<sup>108</sup>

e. Security capacity. A recurring theme of TRADOC Pam 525-8-4 is that, while the U.S. remains the most powerful actor, it cannot – and should not – meet global security challenges alone. This is particularly true given the nation’s resource-constrained environment. In a future

likely characterized by frequent and widespread military challenges, the U.S. cannot respond directly to every crisis. Moreover, some will oppose any U.S. military commitment, no matter how limited or benign, solely to restrain the exercise of American power.<sup>109</sup> Consequently, the U.S. must increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners to build and sustain peace and security, and the future joint force will find it increasingly necessary to pursue objectives by enabling and supporting such partners, whether friendly nations, international organizations, or some other political entity.<sup>110</sup> U.S. forces may need to minimize their own visibility by operating in a supporting role, allowing partners to take the lead, even at some expense in reduced operational efficiency.<sup>111</sup>

f. A review of historical experience, strategic guidance, related activities and programs, responsibilities, lessons learned from more recent activities to build partner capacity, and key aspects of the future OE that affect BPC provide the basis for how the Army approaches BPC. That is the subject of the next chapter.

*“We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. We will nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes, and improve coordination across agencies...The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners.”*

*– The 2011 National Military Strategy*

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Army Approach to Building Partner Capacity**

#### **3-1. Introduction**

The future OE will continue to pose a multitude of complex challenges to the international security environment that will require a persistent and collective effort among partners to surmount. The quote from the 2011 NMS which introduces this chapter underscores the importance of building partnerships and working with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities that enable partners to address their own security challenges, promote a more stable international security environment, and prevail should armed conflict become necessary. For the purpose of this concept, “co-develop” is used to mean that the development of mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities is a shared rather than a U.S.-only responsibility. The Army’s approach to BPC is nested with strategic guidance documents. It is also nested with the JCA framework for capability development.

#### **3-2. The military problem**

How will future Army forces collaborate with partners to build the capacity to prevent and deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies?

#### **3-3. The military solution**

a. Central idea. Future Army forces apply a comprehensive approach to sustained engagement with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to

address shared global interests. Unified action is an indispensable feature of BPC. Unified action to enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions exemplify activities that build long-term partner capacity.

b. The Army's role in BPC.

(1) The Army's primary role in BPC is to lead efforts to co-develop partners' security capacity. The Army integrates the capabilities the operating, generating, and special operations forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts on three levels: tactical, institutional, and ministerial. At the tactical level, Army operating, generating, and special operations forces assist partners in developing their individual and unit proficiency in security operations. At the institutional level, Army generating forces assist partners in developing their institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. At the ministerial level, Army operating, generating, and special operations forces assist partners in developing security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen their ability to synchronize and sustain security operations. The Army's primary role in BPC suggests future Army forces must be able to enhance partners' individual and unit proficiency in security operations, institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation and sustainment, and security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen capacity to synchronize and sustain security operations. The implications of this and other sections of the military solution are the basis for the required capabilities found in appendix B.

(2) The Army's supporting role in BPC, within its means, capabilities and authorities, is to integrate the capabilities of its operating, generating, and special operations forces to support efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, humanitarian relief, disaster response, and other critical government functions. This supporting role includes supporting other U.S. Government agencies in co-developing partners' capacity to counter terrorism, drug, and transnational crime; protect critical infrastructure and the global commons; and, respond to manmade or natural disasters. The Army's supporting role in BPC may be characterized by complex and competing authorities, legal challenges, expectations for rapid response, and limited preparation and training. The Army's supporting role in BPC suggests future Army forces must be able to support efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance the ability of partners for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

c. Tenets. The three BPC tenets – a comprehensive approach, sustained engagement and partner creation and maintenance – establish long-term collective relationships that foster mutual trust and confidence and co-develop capabilities to prevent and deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.

(1) A comprehensive approach is one that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward

a shared goal.<sup>112</sup> A comprehensive approach to co-develop partners' security capacity brings to the effort capabilities beyond those which the Army alone can provide and concomitantly promotes unity of effort. This tenet suggests future Army forces must be able to interact with selected institutions, nations, and populations to apply a comprehensive approach to co-develop partners' security capacity.

(2) Sustained engagement activities are conducted to increase partner capacity, improve visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to combatant commander security cooperation efforts. Nested with U.S. policy goals, diplomatic efforts and the larger U.S. engagement plan, Army sustained engagement activities are conducted consistently over time.<sup>113</sup> This tenet suggests future Army forces must be able to sustain engagements with partners beyond the near-term sourcing and budgeting process to co-develop security capacity, improve visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to combatant command efforts in security cooperation.

(3) Partner creation and maintenance comprises those activities that focus on attaining partner interoperability with U.S. forces and partner support for shared security objectives.<sup>114</sup> The GEF directs the Army to focus roughly half of its security cooperation resources in terms of time, funding, and level of effort on the global core partners identified in the GEF. This tenet suggests future Army forces must be able to leverage and integrate the capabilities of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and nongovernmental partners in support of the joint force commander to achieve unity of effort in promoting shared security objectives.

d. Lines of effort (LOEs). LOEs link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose – cause and effect – to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.<sup>115</sup> Five LOEs apply the central idea and three tenets to discharge the Army's role in BPC.<sup>116</sup>

(1) Improve partners' individual and unit capabilities and capacity for security operations.

(a) Well-trained, cohesive units are the quintessential component for successful military operations of any kind, but particularly crucial in conditions of uncertainty and complexity and when operating decentralized or dispersed.<sup>117</sup> Partners with well-trained, cohesive units are better able to provide for their own security, promote the security of other partners, and participate in coalition operations to succeed in a wide range of contingencies and, if necessary, prevail in war. Army operating forces improve partners' individual and unit capabilities and capacities by efforts such as unit exercises, individual and unit exchanges, mobile training teams, and, in some cases, joining partner units in the field.

(b) Army generating forces incorporate partner personnel in training programs and host partner units to build security capacity. In some cases, Army generating forces may export programs to train partners in non-U.S. facilities. Army generating forces also provides equipment and associated training in individual-level maintenance. ARSOF maintain continuous regional engagement through each GCC, conducting FID, counternarcotic, and SFA training activities. Information sharing and an ability to release information effectively to U.S. partners are critical to this effort.<sup>118</sup> Effective engagements with partners require a thorough understanding of their sociocultural characteristics. Army forces must be able to manage and

share sociocultural information and institutional knowledge in support of efforts to build partner capacity. This LOE suggests future Army forces must be able to conduct culturally-aware, tough, and realistic training with partners to foster the adaptability, initiative, confidence, trust, and cohesion required to conduct security operations.

(2) Develop partners' leaders. Developing partners' leaders through training, leader interactions, and combined planning forges professional militaries that adhere to international standards and principles and are able to support regional or global coalition operations. Army GF education and training programs are the primary instrument in this LOE. Military transition teams, staff assistance, tabletop exercises, simulations, and other leader engagements and exchanges from Army operating and special operations forces are also important to developing partners' leaders. An especially high-payoff objective of this LOE is the development of partner nation's commissioned and noncommissioned officers for the full range of complex missions that the OE may demand. To enable partners' leader development, the Army must possess deep understanding of the sociocultural factors that characterize potential partners, competitors, and adversaries. This greater understanding includes expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills.<sup>119</sup> Similarly, Army educational institutions must have the right resources and faculty that can help prepare the next generation of military leaders with such understanding. Army educational institutions must also have the capability to manage, preserve, and share sociocultural information and institutional knowledge in support of activities that build partner capacity. This LOE suggests future Army forces must be able to identify and meet the professional military training requirements necessary to develop the ability of partners' leaders to conduct security operations.

(3) Develop partners' sustaining institutions. Institutions with the ability to train, educate, generate, sustain, and synchronize their professional security forces bolster the national defense and contribute to a more stable international security environment. Army operating and generating forces conduct staff assistance visits and exchanges to nurture the cooperative relationships among armies and assist partners in developing their institutional capacity to develop, maintain, and sustain unit and individual readiness, grow leaders, and manage security forces. ARSOF collaborate with foreign partners to develop their institutional capacity to protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security. This LOE suggests future Army forces must be able to identify partners' specific requirements and, additionally, possess the collective resources necessary to build partners' institutional capability and capacity to maintain stability and contribute to shared security objectives.

(4) Foster long-term relationships that assure access. The 2011 NMS declares that "We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security." It makes the inexorable linkage between relationship-building and capacity-building patently clear. Fostering trusting relationships is a prerequisite to the long-term co-development of capacity that enhances security. Such efforts include ensuring coalition access to potential trouble spots. Enemies and adversaries will continue developing technologies to impede access and deny critical areas to the U.S. and coalitions. Overcoming enemy anti-access and area denial measures is indispensable to future Army forces.<sup>120</sup> Assuring partners of continued U.S. commitment to regional security is paramount to nurturing trust and confidence, strengthening

partnerships, and promoting future cooperation. Consistent with strategic guidance and theater campaign plans, Army operating, generating, and special operations forces demonstrate U.S. resolve to support regional security by conducting or participating in bilateral, regional, and allied agreements, exercises, and mil-to-mil interactions. Additionally, Army operating, generating, and special operations forces capitalize on opportunities such as staff talks, exchanges, training exercises, and force commitments to improve bilateral or regional security. This LOE suggests future Army forces must be able to establish formal and informal relationships with partners to gain access, enhance cooperation, and advance shared global security interests.

(5) Support BPC efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies. The 2010 NSS calls for aggressive and affirmative development and commensurate resources to strengthen regional partners needed to help stop conflicts, counter global criminal networks, build a stable and inclusive global economy, advance democracy and human rights, and grow the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states to partner in addressing key global challenges.<sup>121</sup> The NSS also emphasizes such efforts must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats and interoperate with the U.S. and other partners to address common security challenges.<sup>122</sup> This LOE suggests future Army forces must be able to support efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

e. Special considerations.

(1) Activities and engagements to build the capacity of partner security forces require a careful assessment of legal authorities. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, places constraints on the use of U.S. military forces to train and advise foreign military police forces due to the potential for human rights violations and other improprieties.<sup>123</sup> This act must be scrutinized closely during the planning, preparation, and execution of activities, programs, and engagements to build partner capacity.

(2) Civil considerations are an inherent part of the military decision making process. They are central to the development of activities, programs, and engagements to build partner capacity. A thorough understanding of the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables of the OE and the civil considerations of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events is key to achieving the desired effects from activities to build partner capacity. These sociocultural factors characterize potential partners, competitors, and adversaries and are essential information to the planning and execution of activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity.

### **3-4. Core operational actions**

a. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 established seven core operational actions the Army must perform to meet future security challenges. The seven core operational actions also serve as linkage and continuity among the family of concepts in the ACF.<sup>124</sup> This section provides a brief synopsis of each core operational action and its relationship to BPC.

b. SFA. As addressed earlier in this concept, SFA entails a comprehensive approach to improve the effectiveness of security forces, either of the host nation or regional security organization. SFA not only improves partners' security, but also fosters cooperation and interoperability should armed conflict become necessary. SFA is a key enabler for the Army to build the security capacity of partners.<sup>125</sup>

c. Shaping and entry operations. Should efforts to prevent conflict fail, future Army forces must be prepared to conduct joint forcible entry operations to overcome anti-access and area denial technologies and capabilities. Forcible entry operations will require combined arms capabilities and access to joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational capabilities, particularly intelligence, fires, logistics, airlift, and sealift. Activities, programs, and engagements to build partner capacity can help shape the OE by influencing the decisions of partner and adversary states, while also ensuring that required joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities exist to enable entry operations when necessary. As a component of theater Army security cooperation efforts, enhanced partner capacity enables combatant commanders to shape their regional security environment and set favorable conditions for the commitment of U.S. forces if shaping and entry operations become necessary.<sup>126</sup>

d. Intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver. Intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver entails the movement of forces to unexpected locations to achieve surprise, bypass enemy anti-access and area denial capabilities, or otherwise gain positional advantage to enable other offensive action. Enhanced partner capacity to conduct intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver reduces the burden and dependence on the U.S. Army and enhances unified action should armed conflict become necessary.<sup>127</sup>

e. Unified land operations. Unified operations is the U.S. Army's basic warfighting doctrine. Its central idea is Army leaders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. This is the Army's contribution to unified action. Army forces demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security through full-spectrum operations, the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Operations conducted outside the U.S. and its territories simultaneously combine three elements – offense, defense, and stability. Within the U.S. and its territories, full-spectrum operations combine the elements of defense support of civil authorities, and as required, defense, and offense to support homeland defense. Activities, programs, and engagements that build partner capacity enhance partners' ability to contribute to unified land operations.<sup>128</sup>

f. Overlapping protection. Overlapping protection entails the application of integrated, overlapping, and mutually supporting capabilities to prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards directed against the U.S., its forces, allied personnel (combatant and noncombatant), and physical assets (critical military and host nation platforms, systems, and infrastructure) operating

from fixed, semi-fixed, and mobile locations. Inherent to overlapping protection is the use of a multidomain approach, which seeks to mitigate threat effects at each domain and holistically across all five domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyber). Enhanced partner capability to conduct overlapping protection reduces the burden and dependence on the U.S. Army.<sup>129</sup>

g. Distributed support and sustainment. Distributed support and sustainment involves the continuous and uninterrupted flow of personnel, supplies, equipment, and units into and throughout the theater of operations. Continuous support and sustainment to deployed joint and Army forces are critical to preventing operational pauses, their consequent loss of initiative, and risk to the mission and to the force. Enhanced partner capability to conduct distributed support and sustainment operations reduces the burden on the U.S. Army and contributes to unified action in case armed conflict cannot be avoided.

h. Network-enabled mission command. Network-enabled mission command capitalizes on the network to extend connectivity of higher levels to the edges of the force with reach-back to both the Operational Force and the GF. This connectivity has the potential to extend the benefits of decentralization without sacrificing coordination or unity of effort. Despite the potential advantages of improved network capabilities, it is likely that future adversaries will attack networks in an attempt to disrupt operations. Enhanced partner capability to apply network enabled mission command enables unified action to prevail in the cyber/electromagnetic contest.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Conclusion**

a. Future challenges to the international security environment cannot be accurately predicted. The probable challenges<sup>130</sup> are too numerous and complex to be mastered solely by military means or through U.S. unilateral actions. Therefore, strategic guidance underscores the increasing need for building partnerships, helping partners address their own indigenous challenges, and working with partners to develop the capabilities and capacities to shape a more stable international security environment and, if necessary, prevail in armed conflict. Enhancing our partners' capacity not only improves the international security environment, it also contributes to the security of the U.S. homeland.

b. The Army's approach to BPC is nested with that strategic guidance. It is also nested with the DOD framework for JCA development. The central idea in the Army's approach to BPC is that future Army forces apply a comprehensive approach to sustained engagement with partners to co-develop mutually beneficial capabilities and capacities to address shared global interests. Unified action is the indispensable feature of BPC, and unified action to enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions exemplify activities that build partner capacity.

c. The three tenets of BPC – comprehensive approach, sustained engagement and partner creation and maintenance – advance shared global interests by establishing long-term relationships that foster mutual trust and confidence, promote a more stable international security environment, and shape conditions to prevail should armed conflict become necessary.

d. The Army's primary role in BPC is to lead efforts to collaborate with partners' to co-develop security capacity. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating, generating, and special operations forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts through security cooperation activities on three levels: tactical, institutional, and ministerial. Beyond its primary role to co-develop security capacity, and within its means, capabilities and authorities, the Army supports efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, humanitarian relief, disaster response, and other critical functions. This supporting role includes supporting other U.S. Government agencies in co-developing partners' capacity to counter terrorism, drug, and transnational crime; protect critical infrastructure and the global commons; and, respond to manmade or natural disasters.

e. Five LOEs apply the central idea and three tenets to discharge the Army's role in BPC: improve partners' individual and unit capabilities and capacity for security operations, develop partners' leaders, develop partners' sustaining institutions, foster long-term relationships that assure access, and support BPC efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies.

f. BPC complements the Army core competencies, combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Combined arms maneuver enables Army forces to gain and exploit the initiative; wide area security enables Army forces to consolidate gains and set conditions for a stable environment; and, BPC enables Army forces to help prevent and deter armed conflict altogether. While activities to co-develop the capacity of partners' security forces contribute to all phases of military campaigns, they yield the greatest return on investment in phase 0. Army forces must be capable of conducting all three – combined arms maneuver, wide area security, and activities to build partner capacity – and often simultaneously.

g. Proper resourcing, planning, and capability development for BPC bolsters confidence in the U.S. commitment to partners' security and regional stability. In turn, increased confidence in the U.S. commitment to partners' security and regional stability alleviates strategic gaps that enemies and adversaries might otherwise exploit, thereby strengthening the international security environment. To achieve BPC's intended goals, the Army will continue to rely on its adaptive, innovative, and resilient Soldiers and leaders who understand its concept for BPC and are prepared to apply it to the unique circumstances of their mission. To complement the power of its human capital, the Army will also develop and institutionalize the capabilities required to co-develop the capacity of partners' security forces.

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## **Appendix A**

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## **Appendix B Required Capabilities**

### **B-1. Introduction**

This appendix reflects the capabilities future Army forces require to implement the Army's approach to BPC. The required capabilities (RCs) were generated from the key ideas in this concept as noted in parenthesis juxtaposed to the RC.

### **B-2. Required capabilities (RC)**

a. RC 1. Future Army forces require the capability to enhance partners' individual and unit proficiency in security operations, institutional capacity for professional education, force generation and force sustainment, and security sector programs to synchronize and sustain security operations. (Army primary role in BPC, Para 3-3b(1))

b. RC 2. Future Army forces require the capability to interact with selected domestic and foreign institutions, nations, and populations to apply a comprehensive approach to co-develop the security capacity of foreign partners. (BPC Tenet #1, Para 3-3c(1)).

c. RC 3. Future Army forces require the capability to sustain engagements with partners beyond the near-term sourcing and budgeting process to co-develop security capacity, improve visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to combatant command security cooperation efforts. (BPC Tenet #2, Para 3-3c(2)).

d. RC 4. Future Army forces require the capability to leverage and integrate the capabilities of all partners in support of the joint force commander to achieve unity of effort in shared security objectives. (BPC Tenet #3, Para 3-3c(3)).

e. RC 5. Future Army forces require the capability to conduct culturally aware training with partners to foster the adaptability, initiative, confidence, trust, and cohesion required to conduct security operations. (LOE #1, Para 3-3d(1))

f. RC 6. Future Army forces require the capability to identify and meet the professional military training requirements necessary in order to develop the ability of partners' leaders to conduct security operations. (LOE #2, Para 3-3d(2)).

g. RC 7. Future Army forces require the capability to identify and possess the resources necessary to build partners' institutional capability and capacity to maintain stability and contribute to shared security objectives. (LOE #3, Para 3-3d(3)).

h. RC 8. Future Army forces require the capability to strengthen relationships with partners in order to gain access, enhance cooperation, and advance shared global security interests. (LOE #4, Para 3-3d(4)).

i. RC 9. Future Army forces require the capability to support efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance foreign partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. (LOE #5, Para 3-3d(5)).

## Glossary

### Section I Abbreviations

ACF	Army Concept Framework
ACSP	Army campaign support plan
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AR	Army regulation
ARCIC	Army Capabilities Integration Center
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ASCC	Army service component command
ASCS	Army security cooperation strategy
BPC	building partner capacity
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	continental U.S.
DASA DE&C	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instructions
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DPPG	Defense Planning and Program Guidance
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FMS	foreign military sales
FORSCOM	U.S. Forces Command
FY	fiscal year
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GEF	guidance for the employment of the force
GF	Generating Force
GFMB	Global Force Management Board
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
JCA	joint capability area
JP	joint publication
JSCP	joint strategic capabilities plan

JSPS	joint strategic planning system
LOE	line of effort
MAG	military advisory groups
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OE	operational environment
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	required capability
SCO	security cooperation organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
TRADOC	U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S.	United States
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USC	U.S. Code
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## **Section II**

### **Terms**

#### **alliance**

The relationship that results from a formal agreement (such as, treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 1-02).

#### **civil considerations**

The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (FM 6-0).

#### **comprehensive approach**

An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal (FM 3-07).

#### **design**

A method of critical and creative thinking for understanding, visualizing, and describing complex problems and the approaches to resolve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas (FM 5-0).

**foreign disclosure**

The conveying of classified or unclassified controlled information to an authorized representative of a foreign government. Disclosures may be accomplished through oral, visual, and documentary modes.

**foreign internal defense**

The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

**foreign military financing program**

Funding program to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through foreign military sales or commercial channels (JP 3-22).

**foreign military sales**

A nonappropriated program through which foreign governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S. (JP 3-22).

**international military education and training**

Activities that contribute to internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel on a grant aid basis (JP 3-22).

**security assistance**

A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives (JP 1-02).

**security cooperation**

All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02).

**security force assistance**

(DOD) The DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 1-02, DODI 5000.68). (Army) The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07).

**sociocultural factors**

The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment (JP 2-01.3).

**stability operations**

Encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U. S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 1-02).

**unified action**

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1-02).

**unity of effort**

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action (JP 1-02).

**Section III**

**Special Terms**

**allies**

Members of an alliance (TRADOC Pam 525-8-4, Para 1-1b).

**building partner capacity**

The outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions (ADP 3-0, Final Approved Draft, 1 Sep 11, paragraph 13).

**co-develop**

The shared responsibility between the U.S. and its partner(s) to develop mutually beneficial security capacity to address shared global interests (BPC Concept, paragraph 3-3).

**combined arms maneuver**

The application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

**partner**

Person, group, institution, or nation who shares or is associated in some action or endeavor (TRADOC Pam 525-8-4, Para 1-1b).

**partnership**

The relationship between two or more people, groups, institutions, or nations that are involved in the same action or endeavor (TRADOC Pam 525-8-4, Para 1-1b).

## wide area security

The application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals (TRADOC Pam 525-3-1).

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Army does not have the responsibility, authority, or resources for domestic capacity-building efforts. Hence, for the purpose of this concept, unless otherwise specified both “partner” and “partnership” are used in the context of foreign, not domestic, entities.

<sup>2</sup> For details on design methodology, refer to Chapter 3, FM 5-0.

<sup>3</sup> For example, during the Philippine War in 1899, the Army trained and advised the Philippine Scouts to combat their insurgency. The Army drew from its experiences in the Civil and Indian Wars to focus on infrastructure improvements as well as establishing police, schools, and local governance (Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984, 52). Efforts to assist partners and allies expanded during World War II. After the landings in North Africa, some 500 Army advisors retrained over 260,000 French troops in eight divisions for combat in Italy and France (Michael Vigenas, *Rearming the French, U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies*, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957, 231). There were also 4,800 dedicated Army advisors with 30 divisions of the Nationalist Chinese forces by late 1944 (Marc Gallicchio “Army Advisors and Liaison Officers and the Lessons of America’s Wartime Experience in China” in *The U.S. Army and World War II, Selected Papers from the Army’s Commemorative Conferences*, Judith L. Bellafaire, ed., Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998, 363). After World War II, Army advisors served around the world as part of military advisory groups (MAGs) – also known as military assistance advisory groups. For example, with less than 300 advisors, by 1953 the Korean MAG successfully reorganized the Republic of Korea army of over 20 divisions into an effective combat force (Robert D. Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Global War on Terror Occasional Paper #18, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006*). ARSOF maintain continuous regional engagement through each geographic combatant command, averaging annually over 270 missions in more than 90 countries conducting FID, counternarcotic and counterterrorism, and security assistance training.

<sup>4</sup> *QDR Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 1.

<sup>5</sup> *QDR Report*, xiii.

<sup>6</sup> CCJO, 26.

<sup>7</sup> NSS, 11.

<sup>8</sup> A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach goes beyond a ‘whole of government approach,’ which is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts and agencies of all departments and agencies of the U.S. to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

<sup>9</sup> The U.S. homeland is described as the physical region that includes the CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 3-27, I-1)

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2005), 1; and JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, I-1.

<sup>11</sup> Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, iii.

<sup>12</sup> Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President (JP 1-02). Homeland defense differs from homeland security, which is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and, minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur (JP 1-02).

<sup>13</sup> Civil support is DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)

<sup>14</sup> See TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 for ACC assumptions.

<sup>15</sup> See TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 for AOC.

<sup>16</sup> Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1-02).

<sup>17</sup> The six subordinate Army functional concepts correspond to the six warfighting functions: mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. The current leadership directed concepts are TRADOC Pam 525-7-01, TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, TRADOC Pam 525-8-3, and this new pamphlet.

<sup>18</sup> Full-spectrum operations is the U.S. Army’s operational concept: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action — lethal and nonlethal — proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.” (FM 3-0)

<sup>19</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 40.

<sup>20</sup> The seven core operational actions are found in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 24-30.

<sup>21</sup> *Unified land operations* is the U.S. Army’s basic warfighting doctrine. Its central idea is Army leaders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. This is the Army’s contribution to unified action (ADP/FM 3-0 GORB, August 2011).

<sup>22</sup> TRADOC Reg 71-20, 30.

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- <sup>23</sup> Adapted from the USMC Security Cooperation Planners' Course.
- <sup>24</sup> NSS, 11.
- <sup>25</sup> NSS, 48.
- <sup>26</sup> NDS, 16-7.
- <sup>27</sup> NMS, 15.
- <sup>28</sup> NMS, 15-6.
- <sup>29</sup> FY2012 Army Campaign Support Plan (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, March 7, 2011), 1.
- <sup>30</sup> Campaign plans are joint operation plans for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space in accordance with the GEF. The campaign plan is the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities (DODD 5132.03, glossary).
- <sup>31</sup> The GEF replaces guidance previously promulgated through the Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, and various policy memoranda related to global force management and global defense posture. For additional details, refer to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Campaign Support Plan 2010 (Arlington, VA: DCSA, January 1, 2010), 2.
- <sup>32</sup> CJCSI 3100.01B.
- <sup>33</sup> QDR, 1.
- <sup>34</sup> QDR, xiii.
- <sup>35</sup> CCJO, 26.
- <sup>36</sup> *2011 U.S. Army Posture Statement*, "BPC through Security Cooperation" information paper.
- <sup>37</sup> *Army Security Cooperation Strategy (ASCS) 2011-2017* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 26, 2010), 1.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>40</sup> The other eight Tier I JCAs are: force support, battlespace awareness, force application, logistics, command and control, net-centric, protection, and corporate management and support. Approved in 2008, the JCA construct was developed in response to the Secretary of Defense guidance that tasks common to all the services be identified, rationalized and placed in one central repository to reduce duplication of effort. DOD formed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which has a Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The JCB, in turn, has a Functional Capabilities Board (FCB). The FCB has a working group for each of the nine Tier I JCAs. For additional details on the JCAs, refer to <http://www.dtic.mil>.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>44</sup> DODD 5132.03, 11.
- <sup>45</sup> Title 22 is less flexible than Title 10, mainly because Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-country and by-program basis, and moving funds from one effort to another requires congressional permission. According to RAND Corporation Study TR734 (xii), which the Army commissioned, the differences in funding authorities for Title 10 and Title 22 results in distinct organizations and cultures and leads to stovepipe approaches to working with foreign countries. Title 22 authorities work well in cases where forces are committed to a theater because of specific legislative language authorizing the conduct of BPC.
- <sup>46</sup> DODI 5000.68, 2.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>48</sup> JP 1-02 and DODI 5000.68, 18.
- <sup>49</sup> DODD 5100.01.
- <sup>50</sup> FM 3-05.137
- <sup>51</sup> JP 1-02 and DODI 5000.68, 18.
- <sup>52</sup> DODI 5000.68, 2.
- <sup>53</sup> DODD 5132.03, 2.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.
- <sup>55</sup> The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management website, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/>. Accessed April 5, 2011.
- <sup>56</sup> DODD 5132-03, 6-7.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 8-9.
- <sup>60</sup> DODD 5132.03, 9.
- <sup>61</sup> For additional details, refer to DODD 5105.75, and FM 3-93.
- <sup>62</sup> FY2012 ACSP, 4.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>68</sup> *Army Security Cooperation Strategy*, 6.
- <sup>69</sup> For additional details, refer to DODD 5105.75.
- <sup>70</sup> For details, refer to AR 11-31.
- <sup>71</sup> FM 1-01, 3-7.
- <sup>72</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-8-1, 50.
- <sup>73</sup> TRADOC G2 input to staffing of draft concept, 22 August 2011.
- <sup>74</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-8-1, 51.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> Army North G3/5/7 email, June 2, 2011. Used by permission of Mr. Leonard Hernandez, US Army North, G-3/5/7 Security Cooperation

<sup>77</sup> Scott G. Wuestner, "Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm" (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute ISBN 1-58487-376-0, February 2009), 6-7.

<sup>78</sup> Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq was commanded by LTG David H. Petraeus from June 2004-September 2005, LTG Martin E. Dempsey from September 2005 to June 2007, LTG James M. Dubik from June 2007 to July 2008, LTG Frank Helmick from July 2008 to October 2009, and LTG Michael D. Barbero from October 2009 until the organization was inactivated and functions subsumed by U.S. Forces-Iraq on 1 January 2010 as part of Operation New Dawn. Retrieved from <http://www.usf-iraq.com/>, on November 16, 2010.

<sup>79</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) website, <http://www.ntm-a.com/documents/enduringledger/el-oneyear.pdf>, accessed November 18, 2010.

<sup>80</sup> Jack D. Kem, "Reflections from Dr. Jack – MoDA: Ministry of Defense Advisors Program," Combined Arms Center blog. Dr. Jack Kem, serving as the Deputy to the Commander, NTM-A/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, points out that the initial MoDA program was so successful that an additional 33 positions were created.

<sup>81</sup> A Military transition team is comprised of 10-15 soldiers who train local military, police, border, and other security forces.

<sup>82</sup> A provincial reconstruction team is a unit consisting of military officers, diplomats, and other subject matter experts, working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. First established in Afghanistan in late 2001 or early 2002, and as of 2008 operate there as well as in Iraq. While the composition and mission of teams may differ, their common purpose is to empower local governments to govern their constituents more effectively.

<sup>83</sup> Comprised of area specialist, social scientists, and researchers, human terrain teams use history and social science to provide Army forces cultural understanding.

<sup>84</sup> Red Teaming is a structured, iterative process executed by trained, educated, and practiced team members who provide commanders an independent capability to continuously challenge concepts, plans, operations, organizations, and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from partners' and adversaries' perspectives.

<sup>85</sup> DASA DE&C input to staffing of draft concept, 19 August 2011.

<sup>86</sup> 2011 U.S. Army Posture Statement, "BPC through Security Cooperation" information paper.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> See, for example, "Advisor Training Shifts to Fort Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission," Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine, September 2009, 9-50.

<sup>98</sup> Army Stability Operations Self-Assessment: Report on Implementation of DODI 3000.05 (Washington, DC: HQDA G-35, March 2011), 9.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>100</sup> Department of the Army *FY2012 Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, February 22, 2011). See also, Vic Bero, et al. "Contingency Expeditionary Force : A Strategy for Supply-Based ARFORGEN" (Fort McPherson, GA: U.S. Army Forces Command, September 28, 2010).

<sup>101</sup> *Army Stability Operations Self-Assessment: Report on Implementation of DODI 3000.05*, 9. The regional support groups from the 162<sup>nd</sup> contain three teams of 8-10 expert trainers and advisors with specific regional skills, including language and cultural awareness capabilities. To provide the 162<sup>nd</sup> with the capacity to support world-wide SFA activities, HQDA recently authorized a growth of an additional 175 military personnel and validated 33 additional requirements to compete for authorizations in Total Army Analysis 14-18. This added capacity will enable the 162<sup>nd</sup> to augment the regionally aligned brigades for initial partner nation engagements.

<sup>102</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance Charter," April 4, 2006.

<sup>103</sup> NSS, 8.

<sup>104</sup> See, for example, QDR, 1 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 9.

<sup>105</sup> QDR, 73.

<sup>106</sup> QDR, 73.

<sup>107</sup> In old English law, the common (or commons) was a tract of ground shared by residents of a village, but belonging to no one. It might be grazing grounds, or the village square, but it was property held in common for the good of all. Today, the term *global commons* is understood to mean sea, air, space, and cyberspace (see, for example, the 2010 National Security Strategy, p.49, and QDR, 8). The point is that in this remarkable period of uncertainty, complexity and accelerated change, global security will depend more than ever before on the unimpeded access to the global commons.

<sup>108</sup> NSS, 14.

<sup>109</sup> CCJO, 26.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>112</sup> JP 1-02.

<sup>113</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 29.

<sup>114</sup> The GEF directs the Army to focus roughly half of its security cooperation resources on the global core partners identified in the GEF. Future Army forces also focus on key Army partners, which the Army chief of staff designates in coordination with ASCC commanders. The Army also applies efforts on regional partners that combatant commands deem essential to achieving their theater campaign plan end states and, at times, other countries depending on their relative position in U.S. national strategy. For additional details, refer to the Army Security Cooperation Strategy 7-8.

<sup>115</sup> FM 3-0.

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<sup>b<sup>116</sup></sup> The five LOEs were derived from, and are consistent with, the *Army Security Cooperation Strategy*

<sup>117</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-3, 18. See also FM 3-0, Para 3-6.

<sup>118</sup> Effective BPC activities require that the Army share technologies, information, and or data to promote unified action. Foreign disclosure is the process by which this is accomplished. By definition, foreign disclosure is the conveying of classified or unclassified controlled information to an authorized representative of a foreign government. Disclosures may be accomplished through oral, visual, and documentary modes. Disclosure must be planned and accounted for in all BPC programs and activities and foreign disclosure requirements, rule, sets and policies must be better understood across the Army. Failure to do so creates risk to the program and our relationships with partner nations.

<sup>119</sup> QDR, xiii.

<sup>120</sup> TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 15, 26-27.

<sup>121</sup> NSS, 15.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>123</sup> 230 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195) Sec. 502B specifies that “except under circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-nationally recognized human rights. Security assistance may not be provided to the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a country, and licenses may not be issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 for the export of crime control and detection instruments and equipment to a country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate (when licenses are to be issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979), that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance and issuance of such licenses. Assistance may not be provided under chapter 5 of this part to a country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance.”

<sup>124</sup> For a detailed description of the seven core operational actions, refer to TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 24-30.

<sup>125</sup> For additional details on SFA, refer to FM 3-07.1.

<sup>126</sup> For additional details on shaping and entry operations, refer to the TRADOC Pam 525-3-02 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1.

<sup>127</sup> For additional details on intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver, refer to TRADOC Pam 525-3-02 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1.

<sup>128</sup> ADP/FM 3-0 General Officer Review Board, August 2011.

<sup>129</sup> For additional details on overlapping protection, refer to TRADOC Pam 525-3-02 and TRADOC Pam 525-3-1.

<sup>130</sup> The 2010 Joint Operational Environment.